Lincoln Memorial University - Duncan
School of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Matthew Lyon

Summer 2016

Comin' Through the Rye: A Requiem
for the Tennessee Summary
Judgment Standard
Matthew Lyon
Judy M. Cornett, University of Tennessee - Knoxville
T. Mitchell Panter

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/matthew_lyon/21/

COMIN’ THROUGH THE RYE: A REQUIEM FOR
THE TENNESSEE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
STANDARD
JUDY M. CORNETT,* T. MITCHELL PANTER,** & MATTHEW R. LYON***
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................. 1027
I.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN TENNESSEE 1028
A. Origins of the Standard ................................................ 1029
B. The Pre-Byrd Period ...................................................... 1031
C. Celotex and Byrd ........................................................... 1034
D. The Turmoil Caused by Hannan .................................. 1036
E. Responding with Rye .................................................... 1040
II.
THE RYE DECISION ............................................................... 1041
A. Facts and Procedural History ....................................... 1041
B. The Majority Opinion .................................................... 1047
C. Dissenting Opinion ........................................................ 1050
III.
IMPLICATIONS OF RYE FOR THE FUTURE .............................. 1052
A. “Micro”-Effects of Rye .................................................... 1052
B. “Macro”-Impacts of Rye ................................................. 1057
1. The Events of 2014.................................................. 1057
2. A Loss of State Court “Independence” ................... 1064
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 1068
INTRODUCTION
What must a defendant do to be granted summary judgment in
Tennessee? This question has given rise to a long, hotly contested
battle over the proper role of summary judgment and, ultimately,
who should bear the burden of producing evidence and when. The
evolution of Tennessee’s summary judgment standard—from the
adoption of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure in 1971 to the
Tennessee Supreme Court’s most recent interpretation of Rule 56 in
2015—is a story of competing visions of the benefits and burdens
associated with civil litigation. How much time should an aggrieved
party have to marshal evidence in support of its claim? How much
time and money should an oppressed defendant have to expend in
resisting a suit that may ultimately prove unfounded? Answers to
these questions have shaped the competing visions of summary
judgment in Tennessee.
This Article examines the development of Tennessee summary
judgment law from its inception in 1971 to the present. It then
1027
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focuses on the most recent summary judgment standard, adopted by
the Tennessee Supreme Court in Rye v. Women’s Care Center of
Memphis.1 Section I recounts the history of summary judgment in
Tennessee including the scholarly debate over whether Tennessee
did—or should—adopt the federal Celotex standard.2 Section II then
examines Rye in detail. Section III discusses the aftermath of Rye,
and suggests issues this case will likely raise for Tennessee courts in
the future.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN TENNESSEE
“[T]here are essentially three kinds of history: what actually
happened, what we are told happened, and what we finally
come to believe happened.”3
Summary judgment likewise has three histories. “What actually
happened” is lost, to the extent that it consisted of the thoughts,
beliefs, and intentions of the actors involved. Those thoughts, beliefs,
and intentions are imperfectly recorded in decided opinions, advisory
committee comments, and treatises contemporaneous with that
history. Various speakers have since recounted their interpretations
of “what actually happened,” but, not surprisingly, those accounts
diverge in significant ways. It is from these often contradictory
accounts that “we [might] finally come to believe [what] happened.”
But is it possible to reconcile these multifarious accounts with one
another to reach a single belief about what happened? Can we
actually settle on a shared belief about what happened in the history
of summary judgment in Tennessee?
The history of summary judgment in Tennessee can be divided
into four phases: (1) the period predating our state’s adoption of the
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure in 1971; (2) the period from

* College of Law Distinguished Professor, University of Tennessee College of
Law. I would like to thank Jack Smith, UT Law class of 2018, for excellent research
assistance.
** Associate Attorney, Paine | Bickers, LLP. I would like to thank Jordan
Carpenter (Vermont Law 2016) for his excellent research assistance.
*** Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Law,
Lincoln Memorial University Duncan School of Law.
1. Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235 (Tenn.
2015).
2. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
3. JOHN EGERTON, SPEAK NOW AGAINST THE DAY: THE GENERATION BEFORE
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE SOUTH 11 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1994).
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adoption of the Rules to the Tennessee Supreme Court’s 1993
decision in Byrd v. Hall;4 (3) the period between Byrd and Hannan v.
Alltel Publishing Co.;5 and (4) the post-Hannan period. This Section
will examine each phase, concluding that we have largely settled on
a shared belief about what happened up until Byrd. The period from
Byrd on, however, is still subject to debate.
A. Origins of the Standard
Summary judgment existed in Tennessee well before the
adoption of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure in 1971. The
Advisory Committee Comments to Rule 56 specifically mention a
summary statutory proceeding against public officials.6 Pre-Rule
practice also included a “speaking demurrer”—a variation of the
typical demurrer—which was used to attack the sufficiency of the
opponent’s pleadings.7 As every first-year law student knows, the
demurrer was the predecessor to the modern motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.8 Because demurrers were designed to attack
the pleadings alone, they could not properly include matters outside
the pleadings.9 However, a practice developed whereby lawyers
attached evidentiary material to demurrers to provide support for
dismissal. These “speaking demurrers” were viewed with disfavor by
Tennessee courts.10 Even when a movant presented evidence that
would resolve a case on its merits, strict pleading rules prevented

4. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993).
5. Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008).
6. “Previously, the term ‘Summary Judgment’ was known in Tennessee
procedure only in connection with the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 25-3-101 et
seq., dealing with summary remedies against certain public officers and with actions
by sureties.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory commission’s comment to 1971 enactment.
See generally Judy M. Cornett, Trick or Treat? Summary Judgment in Tennessee
After Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 77 TENN. L. REV. 305, 307-10 (2010)
(discussing the early history of summary judgment in Tennessee).
7. See Demurrer, BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 2010).
8. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see also TENN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(6).
9. See 1 HENRY R. GIBSON, GIBSON’S SUITS IN CHANCERY § 314 (5th ed. 1955)
(a speaking demurrer “introduces a new fact”).
10. See Brewer v. Norman, 228 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tenn. 1950); Robertson v.
Davies, 90 S.W.2d 746, 751 (Tenn. 1936); Standard Loan & Accident Ins. Co. v.
Thornton, 40 S.W. 136, 139-40 (Tenn. 1896). But cf. 1 LAWRENCE A. PIVNICK,
TENNESSEE CIRCUIT COURT PRACTICE § 10:3 (2016) (“The Tennessee Rules authorize
speaking motions. Speaking motions are those that allege facts to show a predicate
for the relief sought.”).
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the court from considering facts not reflected in the pleadings.11
Indeed, common law procedure did not include a mechanism for
developing evidence prior to trial. Although affidavits were available
in both law and equity courts, only in courts of equity could
depositions be taken.12 Thus, the parties to a suit in a court of law
had no way to bring facts outside the pleadings to the court’s
attention; only at trial could the court receive evidence.13 The
inclusion of discovery devices like depositions and interrogatories in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and later in the Tennessee
rules, enabled the parties to develop facts outside the pleadings prior
to trial. Additionally, summary judgment enabled the parties to
present those facts to the court.
When Tennessee adopted the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1971,
summary judgment was enshrined in Rule 56, which provided:
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or
any cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at
any time after the expiration of thirty (30) days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor upon all or any part thereof.
A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim
is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any
time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a
summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
. . . the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.14
Against this background, it is easy to see why the Advisory
Committee Comments to Tennessee Rule 56 praised summary

11. See Standard Loan & Accident Ins. Co., 40 S.W. at 139-40.
12. See Steven N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PENN. L. REV. 909 (1987).
13. Id. at 937.
14. TENN. R. CIV. P. 56.01-.04 (1972).
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judgment:
The Committee deems the adoption of the provisions of this
Rule to be one of the most important and desirable additions
to Tennessee procedure contained in the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Previously there has been no procedure for
disposition of a case in the trial courts without an actual
trial on the merits if the case could not be disposed of on
demurrer or plea in abatement. A majority of the states have
adopted procedures similar to those contained in this Rule,
which follows the Federal Rule. The Committee considers
this Rule to be a substantial step forward to the end that
litigation may be accelerated, insubstantial issues removed,
and trial confined only to genuine issues.15
B. The Pre-Byrd Period
From adoption of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure up until
the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Byrd, summary judgment
enjoyed something of a Golden Age in Tennessee. During this 14year period, the Tennessee Supreme Court decided 297 cases in
which the phrase “summary judgment” appeared.16 Of these 297
cases, 65 are irrelevant for our purposes.17 Interestingly, of the
remaining 232 cases, there are more affirmances of summary
judgment (122) than reversals (93).18 Of the 93 reversals, 18 were
reversals of trial court awards of summary judgment to defendants
in workers’ compensation cases—these reversals are not surprising
since the Tennessee Supreme Court was traditionally very solicitous
of workers’ compensation plaintiffs of this era.19 More surprising are
the 17 affirmances for defendants in workers’ compensation claims
during this period. Also included in the 122 affirmances are 10 cases

15. TENN. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory commission’s comment to 1971 enactment.
16. The search was conducted in the Westlaw “Tennessee state cases” database
using the search: “summary judgment” & da(after 1971 & before 1993).
17. Irrelevant cases included those involving the timing of the hearing and the
timing of the appeal, including a large number—toward the end of the search results
sorted by “relevance”—in which the term “summary judgment” was simply part of a
quotation or otherwise mentioned in passing.
18. In eight cases, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed
in part.
19. These cases represent appeals directly from the trial court to the Tennessee
Supreme Court authorized by Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 27-3-108 through -118, repealed by
1981 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 449, § 1(10).
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in which cross-motions for summary judgment were filed; in these
cases, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the trial court and
rendered summary judgment for the cross-movant.
The clear majority of the 232 relevant summary judgment cases
involve the standard’s second prong—whether the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law—including several cases in
which the Tennessee Supreme Court announced new law. For
example, in Baker v. Promark Products West, Inc., the trial court
granted summary judgment to a lessor of a stump grinder that
injured its user.20 The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the lessor of a defective product is subject to suit on the theory
of breach of implied warranty.21 In Davis v. Davis, in which a wife
sued her husband for personal injury, the trial court granted
summary judgment to the husband on grounds of interspousal
immunity.22 Reversing the summary judgment, the Tennessee
Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of interspousal tort
immunity.23 In McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., one of the
earliest reversals of a summary judgment, the trial court reluctantly
granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment in a
products liability suit resulting from a defective gas heater.24 The
defendants argued, on the basis of a Tennessee statute, that the oneyear statute of limitations had run prior to the plaintiff’s injury
because the statute provided that the limitations period ran from the
date of the purchase of the product, not from the date it caused
injury.25 The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the grant of
summary judgment, explicitly overruling two of its prior cases
interpreting the statute and holding that the statute of limitations
did not begin to run until the plaintiff discovered, or, in the exercise
of reasonable care, should have discovered her injury.26 Cases like
these lie at the core of summary judgment practice, fulfilling the
intent of the drafters of Rule 56 that cases involving purely legal
issues should be decided prior to trial.
But a small portion of the 232 pre-Byrd cases involve the first
prong of Rule 56, in which a genuine issue of material fact prohibits
the entry of summary judgment. For example, in Lindsey v. Miami

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Baker v. Promark Prods. W., Inc., 692 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tenn. 1985).
Id.
657 S.W.2d 753, 758-59 (Tenn. 1983).
Id. at 759.
524 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tenn. 1975).
Id.
Id. at 491-92.
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Development Corp., a woman attended a political fundraiser, became
intoxicated, and jumped off a second-floor balcony after the host
urged her not to.27 The woman died later that night in a hospital,
and the decedent’s executor sued the owner of the home and the
tenant who hosted the party for negligent failure to render aid.28 In
depositions, other guests testified that the host had urged them to
“wait a while” before calling an ambulance.29 In his deposition, the
host denied having urged the others to delay calling the ambulance,
testifying that he told the witnesses to call an ambulance right
away. The trial court granted summary judgment to both
defendants, but the Supreme Court reversed as to the host.30 The
court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact that
precluded summary judgment because the direct conflict in
testimony regarding the host’s reaction was material to the host’s
liability for negligence and could be resolved only by a factfinder.31
The more modern iteration of summary judgment, in which the
focus is on the sufficiency of the respective party’s motion or
response, is barely represented in these pre-Byrd cases. Indeed, only
a handful of these 232 cases involved a summary judgment motion
that was completely unsupported by evidentiary material. However,
several cases involved the sufficiency of the nonmovant’s response.
For example, in Bowman v. Henard, the plaintiff sued the defendant
for medical malpractice. The defendant moved for summary
judgment, attaching an affidavit from a medical expert.32 The
plaintiff responded with an affidavit from her attorney.33 The
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment, holding:
In this case the only response made by petitioner was the
affidavit of one of her attorneys, not shown to have any
expertise in the field of medicine, based upon an asserted,
but not demonstrated, experience in the specialty area of
medical malpractice, to the effect that in his opinion “a case
of negligence can be made out”; that his “substantial medical
research” convinced him the diagnosis was incorrect; and

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Lindsey v. Miami Dev. Corp., 689 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tenn. 1985).
Id. at 857.
Id.
Id. at 863
Id.
Bowman v. Henard, 547 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Tenn. 1977).
Id.
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that “a jury will likely conclude the defendants were guilty of
negligence.”
The affidavit of an attorney stands precisely on the same
plane with all other affidavits. Accordingly, it must rest
upon his personal knowledge in an area in which he is
competent to testify. The affidavit of the attorney in this case
was totally ineffectual as a response.34
Similarly, in Empress Health & Beauty Spa, Inc. v. Turner, the
plaintiff sued the defendant for injuries suffered when the belt on an
exercise machine broke.35 The defendant moved for summary
judgment, relying on the plaintiff’s acknowledgment during her
deposition that she signed a contract containing an exculpatory
clause.36 The plaintiff failed to respond to the motion, and the
Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.37
In these cases, the Supreme Court took a traditional approach to
summary judgment: if the facts were undisputed, the court analyzed
whether, as a matter of law, the movant was entitled to prevail. If
so, the court granted summary judgment. In at least four cases, the
court used the summary judgment decision to change Tennessee
law.38 If the evidentiary materials supporting the motion and
response revealed a genuine issue of material fact, the court denied
summary judgment.
C. Celotex and Byrd
In fact, these pre-Byrd summary judgment cases seem so logical
that it is difficult to understand the Tennessee Supreme Court’s
angst in Byrd.39 However, a possible explanation emerges from a

34. Id. at 531.
35. Empress Health & Beauty Spa, Inc. v. Turner, 503 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tenn.
1973).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 191.
38. Baker v. Promark Prods. W., Inc., 692 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tenn. 1985); Davis
v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 759 (Tenn. 1983); Chedester v. Phillips, 640 S.W.2d 207,
209 (Tenn. 1982); Ameraccount Club, Inc. v. Hill, 617 S.W.2d 876, 878-79 (Tenn.
1981).
39. See Judy M. Cornett, The Legacy of Byrd v. Hall: Gossiping About Summary
Judgment in Tennessee, 69 TENN. L. REV. 175, 181, 187 (2001). By “embrac[ing]”
Celotex while also “putt[ing] a finer point” on the Court’s holding, and by indicating
that summary judgment was both granted too frequently and not granted often
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pattern observed in the 232 relevant pre-Byrd summary judgment
cases. In 31 of those cases, the Tennessee Supreme Court reinstated
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment after the Tennessee
Court of Appeals had reversed it. This pattern suggests that the
Tennessee Supreme Court already viewed summary judgment as a
useful device, when properly used, before it confronted the Celotex
trilogy.
In a trio of 1986 cases, known as the Celotex trilogy, the U.S.
Supreme Court made it easier for defendants to receive summary
judgment.40 In the trilogy’s most far-reaching case, Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, the Court held that a court could grant summary judgment
to a party that showed, or demonstrated, that the opposing party
lacked evidence to prove an essential element of its case.41 The
Celotex Court further held that this showing could be made without
attaching affidavits or other evidentiary material to the motion, but
the showing must consist of more than a “conclusory assertion” that
the nonmovant cannot prove its case.42 As Justice White, the fifth
member of the Celotex majority, put it in his concurring opinion, “It
is the defendant’s task to negate, if he can, the claimed basis for the
suit.”43 However, these “finer points” articulated by Justice White
were frequently ignored in later descriptions of
the Celotex
standard, which was said to require the nonmovant to “put up or
shut up.”44
Although the Tennessee Court of Appeals had begun citing
Celotex as early as 1986,45 the Tennessee Supreme Court did not
address Celotex until 1993, in Byrd v. Hall.46 This puzzling case,
which has been extensively analyzed elsewhere,47 launched two
distinct histories of summary judgment in Tennessee. In one of these
narratives, which emphasized the court’s “embrace” of Celotex, Byrd
initiated adherence to the federal Celotex standard for summary

enough, the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Byrd was confusing at best and
internally contradictory at worst. Id.
40. See John E. Kennedy, Federal Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex v.
Catrett with Adickes v. Kress and the Evidentiary Problem Under Rule 56, 6 REV.
LITIG. 227, 227 (1987) (the Celotex trilogy “generally favor[s] summary judgment for
defendants”).
41. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
42. Id. at 328 (White, J., concurring).
43. Id.
44. Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 213.
45. See Moman v. Walden, 719 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).
46. Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 212.
47. Cornett, supra note 39, at 176.
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judgment.48 In the other story, Byrd gave rise to a unique state
standard for summary judgment, requiring the moving party to
negate an essential element of the nonmovant’s case.49 This latter
story had its genesis in the Byrd court’s adoption of the “finer points”
put on the summary judgment standard by Justice White in his
Celotex concurrence.50 Furthermore, in a series of cases from 1998 to
2004, the Tennessee Supreme Court reaffirmed its rejection of the
Celotex “put up or shut up” standard.51 The court continued to insist
that a movant must do more than allege that the nonmovant could
not prove its case, lending further credence to Byrd’s alternative
history.
D. The Turmoil Caused by Hannan
Although Byrd and its progeny had rejected the Celotex
standard, the full implications of Tennessee’s negation requirement
were not fully realized until 2008, when the Tennessee Supreme
Court decided Hannan v. Alltel Telephone Co.52 In Hannan, the
plaintiffs testified at their depositions that they could not quantify
their damages, and neither could anyone else.53 Using this
deposition testimony to demonstrate to the trial court that the
plaintiffs could not prove an essential element of their case—
damages—the defendant moved for summary judgment.54 The
plaintiffs responded by saying that they would prove their damages

48. Reply Brief of Appellant at 9-12, Hannan v. Alltell Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1
(Tenn. 2008) (No. E-2006-01353-SC-R11-CV); Andree Sophia Blumstein, Bye, Bye
Byrd? Summary Judgment After Hannan and Martin: Which Way to Go?, 45 TENN.
B.J. 23, 24 (Feb. 2009); Amy M. Pepke, Prove It: Finding the Middle Ground in
Tennessee's Evolving Summary Judgment Standard, 43 TENN. B.J. 12, 13 (July
2007).
49. Cornett, supra note 39, at 189; Cornett, supra note 6, at 320; Judy M.
Cornett, Byrd Still Has Wings, DICTA: THE JOURNAL OF THE KNOXVILLE BAR
ASSOCIATION 11, 12 (2009). This negation requirement obviously echoed Justice
White’s view in his concurrence in Celotex. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 327.
50. Byrd, 847 S.W.3d at 213.
51. See Blair v. W. Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761 (Tenn. 2004); Staples v. CBL &
Assocs., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83 (Tenn. 2000); McCarley v. W. Quality Food Serv., 960
S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1998). But see Denton v. Hahn, No. M2003-00342-COA-R3-CV,
2004 WL 2083711, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2004) (incorrectly stating that the
Byrd court adopted the Celotex standard).
52. Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008), overruled by Rye v.
Women's Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235 (Tenn. 2015).
53. Id. at 4.
54. Id.
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at trial.55 Clearly, application of the Celotex standard in this
situation would have dictated summary judgment for the defendant.
However, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the defendant was
not entitled to summary judgment because it had not negated an
essential element of the plaintiff’s case, as it had not submitted
evidence that the plaintiffs had suffered no damages.56 In doing so,
the court in Hannan also adopted a new alternative to negation: a
movant could have summary judgment by demonstrating that the
nonmovant could not prove an essential element of its case at trial—
not at the summary judgment stage as the Celotex Court had held.57
The Hannan case caused an uproar in the defense bar.58 Most
commentators viewed it as a revolutionary departure from prior
summary judgment law.59 Only a few commentators recognized that
Hannan was merely a logical extension of Byrd’s rejection of the
Celotex standard.60 It is still puzzling why the Tennessee Supreme
Court granted permission to appeal in Hannan,61 as the facts of the
case were terrible. It is not often that plaintiffs testify that their
damages cannot be quantified, nor is it often that a defendant fails
to submit evidence that negates an element of the nonmovant’s case.
Finally, it is not often that the nonmovant fails to present some kind
of evidence in response to a summary judgment motion, no matter
how little support the motion has.62 Application of the negation

55. Id.
56. Id. at 11.
57. Id.
58. See Cornett, supra note 6.
59. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. See also David E. Long, “I
Understand TRCP 56”: The Evolving Tennessee Summary Judgment Standard,
DICTA: THE JOURNAL OF THE KNOXVILLE BAR ASSOCIATION (Nov. 2010), at 14.
60. Judy M. Cornett & Matthew R. Lyon, Redefining Summary Judgment by
Statute: The Legislative History of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-16-101, 8
TENN. J. L & POL’Y 100, 110 (2012).
61. One possible explanation is that the Tennessee Supreme Court was urged
to take the case by the author of the Tennessee Court of Appeals’ opinion: “[b]ecause
of the conflict between our decision in this case and the Denton majority, we
encourage the Tennessee Supreme Court to address (1) the issue of exactly what is
meant by “negating” an element of a plaintiff's claim, and (2) whether Tennessee
follows the Sixth Circuit's “put up or shut up” interpretation of Celotex. Hannan v.
Alltel Publ'g Co., No. E2006–01353–COA–R3–CV, 2007 WL 208430, at *8 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Jan. 26, 2007), aff'd, 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008) (citing J. Cornett, The Legacy of
Byrd v. Hall: Gossiping About Summary Judgment in Tennessee, 69 TENN. L. REV.
175 (2001)).
62. In fact, this is what happened in Byrd v. Hall, where the movant filed an
unsupported motion, while the nonmovant responded with an affidavit. Byrd, 847
S.W.3d at 208.

1038

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83.1027

principle on these extreme facts led to a result that seemed absurd
to most practitioners and judges, as evidenced by a trial judge’s
response to a Tennessee Law Review article on Hannan:63
Dealing with domestic relations cases, and all the
administrative tasks involved in managing a trial docket
seems to consume my professional energy. I don’t have a lot
of energy for engaging in the “elegant burden-shifting
procedure” of Tennessee law. My desire to engage in the
“elegant burden-shifting” analysis is further undermined by
our Supreme Court’s preference that cases not be disposed of
summarily.
I think most of the trial judges are now more hesitant to
grant summary judgments because of the much greater
likelihood of reversal on appeal. Denying a motion for
summary judgment and requiring a case to proceed to trial
presents less appellate “exposure” for a trial judge.
. . . The vast majority of cases I preside over that could
possibly lend themselves to motions for summary judgment
are car wrecks. The issue is almost always fault and/or
damages. I do not see any way in which the defendant can
negate fault in the vast majority of car wreck cases . . .. I
understand how the defense could have possibly shifted the
burden in Hannan on the damages issue but in a personal
injury case it is doubtful that anyone can negate a plaintiff’s
alleged pain and suffering except the plaintiff.64
Like this trial judge, Tennessee’s General Assembly expressed
frustration with the Hannan standard, attempting to legislatively
overrule Hannan.65 Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-16-101
purported “to overrule the summary judgment standard for parties
who do not bear the burden of proof at trial set forth in Hannan [],

63. See Cornett, supra note 6.
64. Letter from Tom Wright, Circuit Judge, Third Judicial Circuit, Part II, to
Judy M. Cornett, University of Tennessee College of Law Distinguished Professor of
Law (June 1, 2012) (on file with author).
65. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-16-101 (Supp. 2015). See generally Judy M. Cornett
& Matthew R. Lyon, Contested Elections as Secret Weapon: Legislative Control Over
Judicial Decision-Making, 75 ALB. L. REV. 2091 (2011-12).
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its progeny, and the cases relied on in Hannan.”66 However, because
the statute applied only to cases filed on or after July 1, 2011, there
existed a robust body of case law decided between 2008 and even
beyond 2011 that applied the Hannan standard. Appellate cases in
the Tennessee Court of Appeals’ Middle and Eastern Sections gave
little hint of the turmoil Hannan caused in the trial courts, probably
because the negation requirement was generally observed and few
summary judgment motions were filed that would be decided
differently regardless of whether Hannan or Celotex applied.
However, there was a trend in the Western Section Court of Appeals
to overstate Hannan’s impact and misinterpret the Hannan test,
requiring more from the movant than the Tennessee Supreme Court
intended. For example, the Western Section referred to the negation
requirement as “high indeed”67 and characterized the Hannan
standard as “stringent.”68 The court even went so far as to assert—
incorrectly—that Hannan required the movant to “prove a
negative.”69 Indicating its misunderstanding of Byrd and its
progeny, the court also asserted that Tennessee Code Annotated
section 20-16-101 was “intended to reinstate the ‘put up or shut up’
standard of summary judgment,”70 even though, as we have seen,
Tennessee never adopted the federal Celotex standard.71 The court
also erroneously conflated the two prongs of Hannan by refusing to
find that the movant had shifted the burden by negation unless the
movant also showed that the nonmovant could not prove an essential
element of its case at trial.72

66. Act of May 20, 2011, ch. 498, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts (legislative findings).
67. Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., No. W2011-02405-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL
210250, at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2013) (quoting Skaan v. Fed. Express Corp.,
No. W2012-01807-COA-R3CV, 2012 WL 6212891, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12,
2012)).
68. Mann v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, Inc., No. W2012-00972-COA-R3-CV,
2013 WL 1188954, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2013).
69. Thomas v. Pointer, No. W2011-01595-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 2499590, at *5
(Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2012); Moore v. Butler, No. W2010-02374-COA-R3-CV, 2011
WL 6004010, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2011); accord Skaan, 2012 WL 6212891, at
*5.
70. Biles v. Purcell, No. M2014-01226-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1275407, at *2 n.1
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2015) (emphasis added).
71. See White v. Target Corp., No. W2010-02372-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL
6599814, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2012) (stating incorrectly that the motion
“might have carried the day” under Byrd but was insufficient under Hannan).
72. See King v. Foht, No. W2013-00518-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 5310436 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2013); Ellington v. Jackson Bowling & Family Fun Ctr., LLC, No.
W2012-00272-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 614502 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2013); White v.
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E. Responding with Rye
When the Supreme Court granted the application for permission
to appeal in Rye v. Women’s Care Center of Memphis,73 three
competing standards for summary judgment existed in Tennessee:
the judicially enunciated Hannan standard, which required that the
moving party who does not carry the burden of proof at trial either
negate an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or
demonstrate that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential
element of its case at trial; the Western Section Court of Appeals’
misinterpretation of the Hannan standard; and the statutory
standard, which purported to adopt the Celotex standard requiring
only that the moving party who does not carry the burden of proof at
trial “demonstrate” or “show” that the nonmoving party lacks
evidence at the summary judgment stage to prove an essential
element of its case.74 Often lost in the many retellings of Hannan is
the fact that the vast majority of summary judgment motions filed in
Tennessee courts already adhered to the Byrd standard, which
required that the movant negate an essential element of the
nonmovant’s claim.75 The prong of Hannan that caused such angst—
the requirement that a movant relying solely on the nonmovant’s
lack of evidence must show that the nonmovant would lack evidence
at trial, not just at the summary judgment stage—was relevant in
only a handful of cases decided by the courts of appeals in the period
between Hannan and Rye.76
When the application for permission to appeal in Rye made it to
the Tennessee Supreme Court, only two Justices from the Hannan
court, Justices Gary Wade and Connie Clark, remained.77 The other
three Hannan Justices, Janice Holder (the author), William
“Mickey” Barker, and William Koch (the lone dissenter), had left the
court. The Justices who replaced them, Justices Holly Kirby and
Jeffrey Bivins, were both appointed by Tennessee’s Republican

Target Corp., No. W2010-02372-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 6599814, at *7 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Dec. 18, 2012).
73. Rye v. Women's Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235 (Tenn.
2015).
74. See supra notes 52 through 72 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 52 through 62 and accompanying text.
76. See Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 276-81 (Wade, J., concurring).
77. See Tennessee Supreme Court, https://ballotpedia.org/Tennessee_
Supreme_Court (last visited Sept. 25, 2016).
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governor, Bill Haslam.78 The fifth member of the Rye court, Chief
Justice Sharon Lee, had not yet taken the bench when Hannan was
decided, although she later indicated that she would have voted with
the majority.79 The appellants in Rye did not raise any issue
regarding the viability of the Hannan standard, but in granting the
application for permission to appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court
itself rewrote the issue on appeal to read as follows:
In addition to other issues raised in the application for
permission to appeal, the Court is particularly interested in
briefing and argument of the question of whether the Court
should reconsider the summary judgment standard
previously articulated by the Court in Hannan v. Alltel
Publishing Co.80
As evidenced by its framing of the issue, the Tennessee Supreme
Court, like many lawyers and judges throughout the state, had come
to believe the story told by the defense bar that Hannan had put a
stop to summary judgment in the trial courts. Thus, the newly
constituted court signaled its intention to overrule Hannan in favor
of the more defendant-friendly Celotex standard.
II. THE RYE DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
On October 26, 2015, approximately thirteen months after its
ominous order granting permission to appeal, the Tennessee
Supreme Court released its decision in Rye.81 As with Hannan, Rye
presented a peculiar set of facts that seemed largely antithetical to
the court’s intended result.82 The plaintiffs, Michelle and Ronald
Rye, were expecting their third child in early 2008.83 During the
pregnancy, Mrs. Rye discovered that she had Rh-negative blood and
planned to receive a RhoGAM injection early in her third trimester
78. Id.
79. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 274 (Lee, C.J., concurring).
80. Id. at 235 (discretionary appeal dated Sept. 19, 2014). The order granting
permission to appeal is viewable here: https://tncourts.gov/sites/default
/files/discretionary_appeals_-_sc_corrected_25sept2014.pdf.
81. Id.
82. Cornett, supra note 6, at 331 (stating that “[t]he bad facts of Hannan
certainly presented an ideal case in which [to adopt Celotex]”).
83. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 238.
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to avoid potential complications in any future pregnancies.84
Unfortunately, Mrs. Rye never received the injection and, as a
result, became “Rh-sensitized.”85 Rh-sensitivity is an irreversible
blood condition that causes the host to develop certain antibodies
that may cross the placenta and attack the red blood cells of an Rhpositive fetus.86 This exposes the fetus to a number of risks, some of
which can be fatal.87
Until Mrs. Rye’s Rh-sensitization, the Ryes planned to have
additional children.88 Concerned with the potential complications,
however, the Ryes began “taking steps to prevent future
pregnancies.”89 However, the Ryes are “practicing Roman Catholics”
and are therefore prohibited from using “traditional” means of birth
control, leaving the couple “in a state of emotional distress.”90 Based
on these events, the Ryes filed suit against Mrs. Rye’s medical
providers, asserting claims for health care liability,91 negligent
infliction of emotional distress, and disruption of family planning.92
In their Answer, the defendants admitted that their failure to
administer the RhoGAM injection during Mrs. Rye’s third trimester
constituted a violation of the applicable standard of care and that
their breach of the standard of care proximately caused Mrs. Rye’s
Rh-sensitization.93 The defendants denied, however, that their
actions resulted in any damage or injury to Mrs. Rye or her
husband.94

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 238-39.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 239.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011, ch. 510, 2011 Tenn. Pub Acts 1505
(codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-26-101 et seq. (Supp. 2011)) (replacing all
references in Tennessee’s Code to “medical malpractice” with the more neutral
“health care liability”).
92. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 239.
93. See id.; see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115(a)(1), (2) (requiring plaintiffs
to prove through competent expert testimony that the defendant/provider deviated
from “the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice”).
94. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 239. Interestingly, the issue of damages was also the
sticking point between the parties in Hannan. Compare Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 10
(“Alltel contends that summary judgment is appropriate because the Hannans
cannot prove within a reasonable degree of certainty that they suffered damages.”),
with Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 266 (“[T]he dispositive question is whether genuine issues of
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After the parties’ discovery depositions were taken, the
defendants moved to dismiss the Ryes’ complaint or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment.95 In their statement of
undisputed material facts, the defendants relied heavily on Mrs.
Rye’s testimony that she had sought no treatment whatsoever for
her Rh-sensitization or associated emotional distress.96 The
defendants also submitted an affidavit from their retained expert,
obstetrician Thomas G. Stovall, M.D., who opined that Mrs. Rye
sustained no injury as a result of the defendants’ failure to
administer the RhoGAM injection.97 Dr. Stovall also expressed his
belief that any risk of harm to Mrs. Rye or her future fetuses as a
result of her Rh-sensitivity was “so remote that it cannot be stated
with any reasonable degree of medical certainty that [any] injuries
would in fact occur.”98
In opposition to the defendants’ motion, the Ryes submitted an
affidavit of their own expert, perinatologist Joseph Bruner, M.D.99
Unlike Dr. Stovall, Dr. Bruner believed that Mrs. Rye’s Rhsensitivity was, in fact, a physical injury because she
“[b]iologically . . . is not the same person she was before she became
Rh-sensitized.”100 Based on this biological change, Dr. Bruner opined
that (1) Mrs. Rye may experience future difficulties with obtaining
blood transfusions and (2) her unborn children “more probabl[y] than
not . . . will experience complications” and will require repeated
blood sampling in the third trimester, which also increases the risk
of complications and premature birth.101
In a subsequent deposition, Dr. Bruner testified as follows:
Q: Okay. And what is the basis for your statement that
[Mrs. Rye] . . . more likely than not [will] become pregnant
again with a child that will have blood not compatible with
her R[h] [negative] status?

material fact exist as to . . . whether Mrs. Rye is reasonably certain to sustain
damages for future medical expenses as a result of her Rh-sensitization.”).
95. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 239.
96. Id. at 239-40; see TENN. R. CIV. P. 56.03 (requiring the moving party at
summary judgment to provide “a separate concise statement of the material facts as
to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue for trial”).
97. Id. at 240.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 240, 242-47.
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A: Because of her religious beliefs, she’s not allowed to
practice contraception, so she and her husband are still
having unprotected intercourse.
....
Q: And she’s—more likely than not, it’s going to be a child
whose blood is not compatible with her R[h] sensitized
status. You’re saying that’s more likely than not, more than
a 50% chance of that?
A: That’s correct.
....
Q: So more likely than not, she will become pregnant again,
because she’s already become pregnant three times, having
unprotected intercourse. More likely than not, the fetus will
be affected in at least one or more future pregnancies
because of the simple fact that R[h-]positive men, 40[%] are
homozygous, 60[%] are heterozygous. Overall, there’s a 70%
chance her pregnancy will be affected . . . .
....
A: Okay. So it’s more likely than not, she’ll become
pregnant. It’s more likely than not, the baby will be
incompatible. It’s more likely than not, the disease will be
moderate to severe, which means that more likely than not,
invasive procedures will begin in the late second trimester,
between 24 and 28 weeks, and these invasive procedures will
occur every seven to ten days, more or less, for the
remainder of the pregnancy, each of those events with a oneto-two percent risk.”102
Sometime after Dr. Bruner’s deposition, defense expert Dr.
Stovall also testified by deposition, doubling down on his opinion
that Mrs. Rye’s Rh-sensitization “more likely than not like
overwhelmingly—overwhelmingly, more likely than not [sic], [Mrs.

102.

Id. at 246-47.
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Rye] would not have any complications” in future pregnancies.103 He
also reiterated that, in his view, Mrs. Rye’s Rh-sensitization caused
her no physical injury or damage.104
Against this backdrop of competing expert testimony, the trial
court granted the defendants’ motion “as to all claims for future
damages . . . arising from blood transfusions or future pregnancies,”
finding that those claims were “too speculative.”105 The trial court
denied the motion for summary judgment, however, as to the Ryes’
emotional distress claims.106
Two weeks before trial and well after all discovery deadlines
under the trial court’s scheduling order had passed, the defendants
renewed their motion for summary judgment.107 On the morning of
trial, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion as to Mr. Rye’s
stand-alone claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
(NIED) and the Ryes’ claim for disruption of family planning.108
However, the court denied summary judgment as to Mrs. Rye’s
physical injury claim because “there ha[d] been a change in her
blood.”109 Following its rulings, the trial court permitted the parties
leave to seek interlocutory appeal with the court of appeals,110 which
the court of appeals subsequently granted.111
After reciting the basic precepts of Hannan, the court of appeals
engaged in a claim-by-claim analysis, affirming in part and
reversing in part the trial court’s judgment.112 Specifically, the court
affirmed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment as to Mrs.
Rye’s physical injury claim, stating that Dr. Bruner’s testimony
created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mrs. Rye’s Rhsensitivity was a “bodily injury.”113 However, the court reversed the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment with regard to Mrs. Rye’s
claim for future medical expenses and Mr. Rye’s stand-alone NIED
claim.114 In reaching this result, the court acknowledged the

103. Id. at 247.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 247, 249.
106. Id. at 247.
107. Id. at 248.
108. Id.
109. Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, No. W2013-00804-COA-R9CV, 2014 WL 903142 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2014).
110. See TENN. R. APP. P. 9.
111. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 248; see TENN. R. APP. P. 9.
112. Rye, 2014 WL 903142, at *4-5 (alterations and internal citations omitted).
113. Id. at *9.
114. Id. at *11.
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speculative nature of Mrs. Rye’s future medical expenses and the
dearth of evidence to support Mr. Rye’s NIED claim; nevertheless,
the court reasoned that the “high burden of the Hannan standard”
necessitated reversal.115 For further support, the court cited to the
following language from another Western Section opinion, White v.
Target Corp., authored by then-Judge Holly Kirby:
Under Hannan, as we perceive the ruling in that case, it is
not enough to rely on the nonmoving party’s lack of proof
even where, as here, the trial court entered a scheduling
order and ruled on the summary judgment motion after the
deadline for discovery had passed. Under Hannan, we are
required to assume that the nonmoving party may still, by
the time of trial, somehow come up with evidence to support
her claim.116
This strained interpretation of Hannan’s alternative burden
shifting mechanism—i.e. “show[ing] that the nonmoving party
cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial”—had become
a theme in the Western Section by the time Rye was decided.117 Just
as with Denton in the post-McCarley days, the Western Section’s
peculiar view of Hannan provided the perfect opportunity for
Tennessee Supreme Court intervention.118 On the one hand, the
court could finally set straight what it intended to accomplish with
Hannan’s clarification of Byrd and McCarley, putting to rest the
misapprehension and angst engendered in the bench and bar since
Hannan’s release.119 Alternatively, with Hannan’s author no longer
on the court and the substitution of two new Republican appointees
on the Court (including the architect of the Western Section’s
divergent interpretation of Hannan, Justice Holly Kirby), perhaps
the time had to come for the Court to reconsider the divergent path
it had chosen all those years ago in Byrd.

115. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 249-50; Rye, 2014 WL 903142, at *11.
116. No. W2010–02372–COA–R3–CV, 2012 WL 6599814, at *7 n.3 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Dec. 18, 2012).
117. See, e.g., Thomas, 2012 WL 2499590, at *5; Moore, 2011 WL 6004010, at *6;
accord Skaan, 2012 WL 6212891, at *5.
118. See Cornett, supra note 6 at 330–31.
119. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 64; Blumstein, supra note 48, at 23 (“While
Hannan still views summary judgment as a useful tool to weed out frivolous claims,
it has made that tool less sharp and more difficult to wield. Summary judgments will
be harder to come by in state court.”) (footnote, internal quotation, and citations
omitted).
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As with Hannan, however, the question becomes: “Why take this
case?” First, with the Tennessee General Assembly’s attempt to
legislatively overrule Hannan in 2011, the fleeting number of cases
governed by Hannan hardly militated in favor of Rule 11 review.120 .
If Hannan were to remain the law of the land, should not the court
have waited until a challenge to the summary judgment statute
were before it? Conversely, if the court intended to overrule
Hannan, were there no better cases in which to do so? Again, Rye
was a classic “battle of the experts” with largely disputed facts and
no clear-cut legal issue requiring resolution by the supreme court.121
B. The Majority Opinion
The Tennessee Supreme Court began its analysis in Rye with an
overview of the “history” of summary judgment in Tennessee,
starting with the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure and ending
with the “aftermath” of Hannan.122 In its discussion, the court did
its best to (1) prop up the federal standard as promoting the
expeditious disposition of “frivolous cases” and (2) highlight the
consistency between the federal standard and the standard
embraced by Tennessee’s courts before Byrd.123 From there, the
court expended a great deal of effort explaining the confusion that
Byrd incited with its dueling embrace of Celotex and subsequent
“observations” as to how a moving party at summary judgment may
shift the burden of production to its adversary. Based solely on a
review of the court’s edited “history,” one could easily see that
Hannan’s execution was imminent.
Indeed, after finishing its review of Celotex, Byrd, and Hannan,
the court heaved a series of slurs at Hannan, describing it as

120. After enactment of the statute, Hannan only applied only to cases filed
before July 1, 2011. See 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 498; see also Matthew R. Lyon & Judy
M. Cornett, Hannan, The “Zombie Case”: Will the Tennessee Supreme Court Drive a
Stake Through Its Heart?, DICTA: THE JOURNAL OF THE KNOXVILLE BAR
ASSOCIATION 13, 13 (2014) (recognizing that Hannan was “already on its way out”
when the supreme court granted review in Rye).
121. See Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 235.
122. Id. at 250-61.
123. Id. at 256–259; Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 215 n.5 (Tenn. 1993). Much
like Justice Koch’s dissent in Hannan, however, the Court’s focus on Byrd resulted in
its brushing aside the important role that McCarley, Blair, and Staples played in the
development of Tennessee’s summary judgment jurisprudence. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at
258 61 (relegating those cases to parentheticals and a single footnote with no real
discussion or analysis).
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“unworkable,” “incompatible with the history and text of Tennessee
Rule 56,” “frustrat[ing] the purposes for which summary judgment
was intended,” and having “shifted the balance too far.”124 Thus, the
court determined that the time had come “to correct course, overrule
Hannan, and fully embrace the standards articulated in the Celotex
trilogy.”125 Curiously absent from the court’s opinion, however, is
any real evidence or data to substantiate its view that Hannan
negatively impacted the availability of summary judgment in
Tennessee.126 Instead, the court simply relied on a misinterpretation
of Hannan espoused by the Western Section—i.e., that the second
prong of Hannan required reviewing courts to turn a blind eye to
scheduling orders and pretend that a nonmoving party could
“somehow,” some way pull the magical rabbit from its evidentiary
hat at trial.127
Turning to the facts of Rye, the court concluded that summary
judgment should have been granted as to the Ryes’ remaining
claims. First, the court reviewed the evidence presented as to Mrs.
Rye’s future medical expenses, concluding that “even assuming Mrs.
Rye’s Rh-sensitization is considered a presently existing physical
injury, the undisputed facts demonstrate that [she] has not
sustained any damages related to this injury and that no such
damages are reasonably certain to occur.”128 In reaching this
conclusion, the court reviewed the testimony of the parties’ experts
and acknowledged that they disagreed as to the probability and
extent of any future harm to Mrs. Rye and any children she might

124. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 261, 264.
125. Id. at 264.
126. In fact, the only “evidence” to support the court’s conclusion as to the impact
of Hannan appears in Justice Jeffrey Bivins’s concurring opinion, in which he makes
anecdotal references to a set of summary judgment motions before him as a trial
court judge the day after Hannan’s release. See id. at 273 (Bivins, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 261 (majority opinion) (citing Boals v. Murphy, No. W2013-00310COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 5872225, at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2013) and White v.
Target Corp., No. W2010-02372-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 6599814, at *7 n.3 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Dec. 18, 2012).
128. Id. at 265. As the dissent points out, however, the court’s treatment of
future medical expenses as the only measure of damages is unorthodox at best and
ignores the inherent value attached to any tangible, physical injury, including, for
example, a change in a person’s blood. See id. at 283 n.13 (Wade, J., concurring and
dissenting) (stating in part that “[n]owhere in the majority's analysis, however, is
there a discussion of presently existing damages in the form of an altered bodily
status or a decreased ability to bear children. Instead, the majority focuses solely on
‘whether Mrs. Rye is reasonably certain to sustain damages for future medical
expenses as a result of her Rh-sensitization.’”) (emphasis omitted).
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bear in the future.129 Relying in large part on Mrs. Rye’s age—39—
and the fact that six years had passed since the filing of this suit
without Mrs. Rye’s becoming pregnant, the court concluded that
“Mrs. Rye’s evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate
that future medical expenses are reasonably certain to
occur . . . [because any such damages] depend entirely upon
contingencies that have not . . . and may never occur.”130
Moving to the Ryes’ separate claims for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, the court again concluded that summary
judgment was appropriate.131 As to Mr. Rye’s stand-alone claim, the
court concluded that Mr. Rye had failed to provide expert proof of a
severe emotional injury, which was required by well-established
Tennessee case law.132 Similarly, the court concluded that Mrs. Rye
had also failed to meet her burden of producing evidence sufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact as to her severe mental
injury.133 In support, the court referenced Mrs. Rye’s testimony that
she had not sought any medical or psychological treatment and that
her parenting and daily routines remained the same since becoming
Rh-sensitized.134 For these reasons, the majority remanded the case
to the trial court “for entry of summary judgment on these claims
and any further necessary proceedings . . . .”135

129. Id. at 266–68 (majority opinion). In a scathing footnote written in response
to the dissent’s claim that the majority had weighed the evidence in its assessment of
the experts’ respective testimony, the court claimed that the dissent had “harvested
from the record only those facts supporting its favored result.” Id. at 269 n.15.
130. Id. at 268.
131. Id. at 269–72.
132. Id. at 271. See Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 446 (Tenn. 1996)
(requiring expert medical or scientific proof of a severe mental or emotional injury to
maintain a stand-alone claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
133. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 272.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 273. It remains unclear from the majority’s opinion exactly what
“further proceedings” are actually necessary on remand. Although the court was
asked to address only the proof of future medical expenses, the court’s opinion
suggests that Mrs. Rye’s inability to establish future medical expenses bars her
claim for health care liability. As the dissent recognizes, however, by focusing on
Mrs. Rye’s ability to establish future medical expenses, the majority overlooked the
inherent value that flows from the change in Mrs. Rye’s physiology due to the
defendants’ admitted negligence. Id. at 282–83, 285 n.15 (Wade, J., dissenting).
Indeed, future medical expenses are not required to maintain a claim for health care
liability. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115(a) (2012) (requiring health care liability
plaintiffs to prove (1) the applicable standard of care; (2) the defendant’s breach of
that standard; and (3) proximate cause).
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C. Dissenting Opinion
In a no-holds-barred dissent, now-retired Justice Gary R. Wade
took the majority to task for what he perceived as the court’s
capitulation to the legislature, which waged war on the judiciary
beginning in 2011 when it attempted to legislatively overrule
Hannan.136 In his attempt to explain the granting of permission to
appeal in a run-of-the-mill summary judgment case, Justice Wade
wrote:
By granting Rule 11 review in a case which pre-dated the
passage of a statute purporting to set a new standard for
summary judgment, by rejecting the well-established
doctrine of stare decisis, and by acquiescing to the standard
proposed by the General Assembly, my colleagues have
preempted the future consideration of an important
constitutional issue—whether the General Assembly, by its
enactment of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-16-101
(Supp. 2014), has violated the separation-of-powers
doctrine.137
Rising to the defense of her colleagues in the majority, Chief
Justice Sharon Lee responded to the dissent’s assertion that the
court had surreptitiously skirted the separation of powers issue by
stating:
I am unwilling to saddle litigants with a summary judgment
standard that is unworkable simply to set the stage for a
showdown with the Legislature over its authority to enact a
summary judgment standard. The dissent references this as
a “game of chicken” between the General Assembly and the
Tennessee Supreme Court. I call it fulfilling my oath of
office and maintaining the independence and integrity of the
judiciary.138
In his concurring opinion, Justice Bivins similarly took issue
with the dissent’s separation of powers concerns, calling the dissent’s

136. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 275 (Wade, J., concurring and dissenting); Cornett &
Lyon, supra note 65.
137. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 275 (Wade, J., concurring and dissenting).
138. Id. (Lee, C.J., concurring).
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position “baffling, at best.”139 In Justice Bivins’s view, if the court
were truly kowtowing to the legislature, “would not it have been
much easier to avoid this case and simply affirm the
constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-16-101 in
an ultimate constitutional challenge to that statutory provision?”140
This too caught sharp criticism from Justice Wade, who called
Justice Bivins’s assessment of the separation of powers issue
“troubling” and “indicative of the belief that th[e] Court can reach
whatever result it desires in any given case . . . .”141
This sharp rhetoric between the members of the majority and the
dissent is rarely seen in Tennessee’s highest court and is arguably
emblematic of an ideological change that has occurred in the court in
the seven years between Hannan and Rye. When Hannan was
decided, Democrats held control—albeit narrowly—over both houses
of the Tennessee General Assembly (the “General Assembly”).
Likewise, Tennessee’s governor at the time, Phil Bredesen, was also
a Democrat and had appointed three of the five justices on the
Hannan court. By the time of Rye, however, the political landscape
in Tennessee was vastly different: Republicans had a supermajority
in both houses of the legislature; Republican Bill Haslam was in his
second term as governor; and the two newest members of the court
were Republican appointees with conservative leanings. Further, the
incumbent members of the court, Chief Justice Sharon Lee and
Justices Cornelia Clark and Gary Wade, had just escaped an
unprecedented political shootout led by Tennessee’s Lieutenant
Governor Ron Ramsey, which brought the tensions between those
two branches of government to a head in the 2014 election cycle.
Whatever role politics may have played in the court’s decision to
depart from Hannan, it is clear that the history upon which the
majority relied had little grounding in the actual language of
Hannan. Again, White and its progeny provided the principal
backing for the court’s conclusion that Hannan imposed an
“insurmountable burden” on moving parties at summary judgment
who did not bear the burden of proof at trial.142 With the ascension
of Justice Kirby to the Tennessee Supreme Court, these
intermediate appellate decisions suddenly became authoritative law.
Whether it was intentional or inadvertent, “the unfortunate
footnote” from White proved to be the end of Hannan and

139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 274 (Bivins, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 290 n.18 (Wade, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 261 (majority opinion).
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Tennessee’s unique approach to summary judgment.143
III. IMPLICATIONS OF RYE FOR THE FUTURE
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s sweeping decision in Rye
obviously has implications for the future of civil litigation in
Tennessee. It is important for lawyers and the clients they serve to
understand these immediate effects. To end our analysis here,
however, would be to miss the forest for the trees. Rye is actually
indicative of a broader trend in Tennessee to “federalize” elements of
the state constitution and state court system. This movement to
conform state to federal law rolls back decades of judicial decisions
in Tennessee recognizing essential distinctions between the federal
and state constitutions. It is unclear whether this trend actually
illustrates changing preferences in favor of the federal system or is
simply reflective of the state’s current political climate.
Indeed, any analysis of Rye must include a discussion of the
“elephant” in the room: the General Assembly’s concerted attack on
the state judiciary. This challenge reached its zenith in 2014,
following both a contested retention election involving three state
supreme court justices that was spearheaded by the lieutenant
governor and the adoption of Amendment Two, which changed the
state constitution to reform the method by which appellate judges
are selected. The pressure from conservative political forces, both
inside and outside the state, to remake the judicial branch of
government as “red to the roots” in order to mirror the executive and
legislative branches,144 has little to do with the technicalities of the
burden-shifting standard on summary judgment motions. It would
be naïve, however, not to acknowledge that Rye may be one of the
first fruits of these efforts.
A. “Micro”-Effects of Rye
Before considering the broader issues surrounding the Rye
decision, it is important to look at its direct impacts on civil litigants
in Tennessee. One basic question to be answered is: given the
enactment of the statute in 2011 establishing a new summary
judgment standard in Tennessee,145 what exactly is the standard for

143. Id. at 280 n.10 (Wade, J., concurring and dissenting).
144. See Category: Red to the Roots, TENNESSEE REPUBLICAN PARTY,
http://tngop.org/category/red-to-the-roots/ (last visited July 9, 2016).
145. See discussion supra Part II.
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litigants to follow going forward? Is it Rye or the statute, or is this a
distinction without a difference? In addition, although Rye impacts
all civil cases, it will have particularized effects depending on the
cause of action. By way of example, this section addresses Rye’s
implications for employment discrimination cases in Tennessee.
The Rye majority was clear that its decision should be applied
retroactively. Specifically, the court characterized its decision as a
“proper exercise of [its] authority to reconsider, and when
appropriate, abandon rules of law previously articulated in judicial
decisions,” and further stated that “[i]n civil cases, judicial decisions
overruling prior cases generally are applied retrospectively.”146
However, because the decision was to overrule Hannan and apply
the Celotex burden-shifting test to summary judgment motions, the
new Rye standard should arguably apply only to those cases to which
Hannan applied: cases filed prior to July 1, 2011. The 2011 statute
purporting to legislatively overrule Hannan applies to cases filed on
or after that date,147 and the court stated that “[the] statute [was]
irrelevant to [the Ryes’] appeal.”148 Moreover, Justice Bivins’s
concurrence makes clear that the statute was not at issue in Rye,
positing that the court “may yet face a challenge to this
constitutionally-suspect statute because of the specific language of
that provision to determine if the two approaches are consistent.”149
All of these statements by the court (not to mention longestablished principles of judicial review) notwithstanding, a
subsequent decision of the court suggests that it believes Rye
abrogated the 2011 statute by implication. In American Heritage
Apartments, Inc. v. Hamilton County Water and Wastewater
Treatment Authority, a not-for-profit corporation operating a lowincome housing complex sued a local utility, claiming that the utility
had exceeded its statutory authority by levying a charge on its

146. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 263 n.9 (emphasis in original) (citing Hill v. City of
Germantown, 31 S.W.3d 234, 239 (Tenn. 2000)).
147. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-16-101 (2016).
148. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 263 n.9.
149. Id. at 274 (Bivins, J., concurring). Justice Clark’s majority opinion also
concedes that by passing the statute, the legislature “has arguably invaded the
province of the judiciary.” Id. at 264 n.10 (majority opinion). One observer noted in
response to this statement that “the Court’s decision to not specifically address this
constitutional issue may arguably encourage similar legislative invasion in the
future.” C.E. Hunter Brush, Will the Tennessee General Assembly Continue to Tell
the Judiciary to Put Up or Shut Up?, BIZLITNEWS BLOG (Nov. 19, 2015),
http://www.butlersnow.com/2015/11/will-the-tennessee-general-assembly-continueto-tell-the-judiciary-to-put-up-or-shut-up/ (emphasis in original).
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customers.150 The utility filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that the administrative procedures that applied to it under
the Utility District Law of 1937 had yet to be exhausted. Because the
lawsuit was filed in October 2011—after the July 1, 2011 effective
date of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-16-101—the trial court
correctly applied the statute.151 Noting that it had decided Rye in the
interim, however, the supreme court stated that “[i]n the wake of
Rye, we apply the summary judgment standard set forth in that
case . . . .”152 Thus, American Heritage Apartments indicates that Rye
sets forth the burden-shifting standard on summary judgment for
not only those cases filed prior to July 1, 2011 (i.e., those to which
Hannan applied), but also all subsequent cases.153
In his Rye dissent, Justice Wade characterized and criticized the
majority’s decision to overrule Hannan as an attempt to deliberately
avoid the constitutional conflict that would arise if it passed
judgment on the 2011 statute.154 The majority responded that
Justice Wade’s suggestion was “unfathomable” and “lack[ed] legal or
factual foundation,”155 that “[the] statute [was] irrelevant to [the
Ryes’] appeal,”156 and that the court’s decision to overrule Hannan
was “independent of and unrelated to legislative action.”157 In his
concurring opinion, Justice Bivins derided Justice Wade’s assertion
as “rather baffling, at best” and opined that the court “may yet face a
challenge to this constitutionally-suspect statute . . . .”158 Yet barely

150. 494 S.W.3d 31, 35 (Tenn. 2016).
151. Id. at 39.
152. Id. at 40.
153. American Heritage Apartments resolved a dispute that had arisen in the
Eastern Section of the Tennessee Court of Appeals regarding the retroactivity of Rye.
In two post-Rye opinions for cases filed after July 1, 2011, the majority applied the
statute. Judge D. Michael Swiney concurred in the judgments but argued that when
the Rye majority stated that its opinion should be applied retrospectively, Rye
became the controlling standard even in cases that would otherwise be controlled by
the statute. Rogers v. Blount Mem’l Hosp., No. E2015-00136-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL
787308, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2016) (Swiney, J., concurring); Thomas v.
Standard Fire Ins. Co., No. E2015-01224-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 638559, at *7 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2016) (Swiney, J., concurring). American Heritage Apartments
confirmed that the majority of the court agrees with Judge Swiney’s analysis.
154. Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 293 (Tenn.
2015) (Wade, J., concurring and dissenting). See also supra Part II.C (discussing
Justice Wade’s dissent).
155. Id. at 264 n.10 (majority opinion).
156. Id. at 263 n.9.
157. Id. at 264 n.10.
158. Id. at 274 (Bivins, J., concurring).
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six months after Rye, the court stated in American Heritage
Apartments, without any accompanying analysis, that the Rye
standard applies even in those cases in which Tennessee Code
Annotated section 20-16-101 should otherwise apply. Although the
statute appears to no longer be applicable in any case, we cannot say
that court has invalidated it because the court has not actually
addressed the statute at all. Perhaps the court has implicitly
invalidated the statute, the effect of which will be to pretermit any
challenge to the statute because no litigant will ever need to raise
one. In other words, the court has avoided a constitutional conflict
with the legislature by quietly rendering the statute a dead letter.
This outcome makes Justice Wade’s concerns in his Rye dissent not
“baffling” or “unfathomable,” but prescient.
One might argue that the court’s decision to replace the statute
with the Rye standard does not matter. After all, the two standards
both purport to overrule Hannan and adopt the federal Celotex
standard for burden-shifting on a summary judgment motion where
the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial. However,
the language of the statute is different from the standard adopted in
Rye. Under Rye, as under Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in
Celotex, if the party moving for summary judgment who does not
bear the burden of proof at trial points to a lack of evidence by the
nonmoving party at the summary judgment stage, the burden shifts
to the nonmoving party to present evidence showing a genuine issue
of material fact in order to survive summary judgment.159 By
contrast, under the statute, if the party moving for summary
judgment who does not bear the burden of proof at trial points to a
lack of evidence by the nonmoving party at the summary judgment
stage, then the moving party “shall prevail on its motion for
summary judgment.”160 “Read literally, this enactment provides no
opportunity for the nonmovant to respond to the movant’s
showing.”161 One might write this conflict off as simply inartful
drafting by the General Assembly, but the difference in the language
is stark. Perhaps the General Assembly will not concern itself with
having its five-year-old standard implicitly invalidated by the court,

159. Id. at 264 (majority opinion).
160. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-16-101 (2016).
161. Cornett & Lyon, supra note 65, at 2130. It also conflicts with the plain
language of Rule 56.03, which unambiguously states requires that the moving party
at summary judgment provide “a separate concise statement of the material facts as
to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue for trial.” TENN. R. CIV.
P. 56.03.
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since it essentially achieved the goal it sought in 2011 by having the
state summary judgment standard match the federal standard.
While it would be wise for litigants in Tennessee, given the court’s
statement in American Heritage Apartments, to cite Rye as the
standard for burden-shifting on a summary judgment motion in
Tennessee, the court’s implicit abrogation of a duly enacted statute
that remains a part of the Tennessee Code is perplexing.
Another open question after Rye is its effect on particular areas
of the law that developed under the Hannan standard. One such
example is the standard of review for summary judgment in
employment discrimination cases. In two cases decided in 2010,
Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co. and Kinsler v. Berkline, LLC, the
Tennessee Supreme Court abandoned the well-known burdenshifting test used in employment discrimination cases from
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green162 as incompatible with the
Hannan standard.163 Specifically, the court stated that, “when
applied at the summary judgment stage, the shifting burdens of the
McDonnell Douglas framework obfuscate the trial court's summary
judgment analysis,” and that “the inquiries required by the
McDonnell Douglas framework may result in trial courts disposing
of factual questions on summary judgment.”164 Gossett and Kinsler
were authored by Justice Holder, who also authored the Hannan
opinion. Although she concurred in Hannan, Justice Clark (joined by
Justice Koch) dissented in Gossett and Kinsler, arguing that the
Hannan standard (which she would deem “unworkable” five years
later in Rye) was compatible with the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting standard in employment discrimination cases.165
The decisions in Gossett and Kinsler were nearly as controversial
as the Hannan decision they followed. In the same year the General
Assembly passed the statute purporting to overrule Hannan, it
enacted another law to overrule Gossett and Kinsler and reestablish
the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework as the standard
in Tennessee.166 Indeed, in his Rye concurrence, Justice Bivins
referred to Gossett and Kinsler as “open hydrant[s]” that

162. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
163. See Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010); Kinsler v.
Berkline, LLC, 320 S.W.3d 796 (Tenn. 2010).
164. Gossett, 320 S.W.3d at 783.
165. Id. at 789 (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting); Kinsler, 320 S.W.3d at 802.
166. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304(f), (g) (2011); see Todd v. Shelby Cty., 407
S.W.3d 212, 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (observing that Gossett was abrogated by the
statute effective June 10, 2011).
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extinguished “any remaining flicker in the flame of hope that
Hannan merely represented a ‘refinement’ of Byrd.”167 However, the
Rye majority declined to address those opinions directly while at the
same time acknowledging that Rye “calls into question the continued
viability of Gossett and Kinsler.”168 Even without further statement
by the Tennessee Supreme Court on this issue, given the 2011
statutes seeking to abrogate Gossett and Kinsler and Hannan’s
relegation to the history books, employment lawyers in Tennessee
should assume that Gossett and Kinsler are not good law even
though they have not formally been overruled. This is particularly
the case in the Western Section, where the Tennessee Court of
Appeals anticipated the inevitable and concluded, based upon Rye,
“that the McDonnell Douglas framework once again applies in
Tennessee to analyze discrimination claims at the summary
judgment stage.”169
B. “Macro”-Impacts of Rye
The Rye decision concerns summary judgment, but its impacts
are being felt well beyond the civil realm. It was written in an era of
political tension between the judicial and legislative branches in
Tennessee, the end result of which may be a new Republican
supreme court majority undoing much of the work of a court that has
had a majority of Democratic appointees for the entire modern era.
It may also be indicative of an apparent movement away from a
period of state supreme court independence towards an era of
conformity with federal law and standards.
1. The Events of 2014
In 2014, unprecedented attention was placed on the Tennessee
appellate court system. Under the merit selection system that had
existed in Tennessee since the early 1970s, appellate court judges
were nominated and evaluated by statutory commissions and
appointed by the governor. They then stood for state-wide retention

167. Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 273 (Tenn.
2015) (Bivins, J., concurring). Justice Bivins concluded that “Gossett and Kinsler
fully confirmed that Hannan, indeed, constituted a radical departure from prior
summary judgment jurisprudence.” Id. at 273–74.
168. Id. at 264 n.11 (majority opinion).
169. Yount v. FedEx Express, No. W2015-00389-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 1056958,
at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2016).

1058

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83.1027

elections every eight years. This system, known as the “Tennessee
Plan,” existed in relative peace for decades, with only one Tennessee
Supreme Court justice losing a retention election during that
time.170 However, beginning in 2010, when Republicans achieved
unprecedented electoral success and won both the governor’s
mansion and majorities in both houses of the legislature for the first
time since Reconstruction, leaders of the conservative movement
began to set their sights on the one branch of state government their
party did not control. Deep conservative unrest bubbled to the
surface regarding a system of selecting judges that many
Republicans believed simply reinforced the longtime Democratic
dominance of the Tennessee Supreme Court (and, of lesser
prominence politically, the state’s two intermediate appellate
courts).171 The details regarding the evolution of the Tennessee Plan
and the GOP’s opposition to it have been discussed extensively
elsewhere.172 Ultimately, it culminated in two seismic events in 2014
that would affect the composition and direction of the Tennessee
Supreme Court in both the short-term and long-term.
First, in August 2014, the members of the Tennessee Supreme
Court faced their octennial retention election, in which the state’s
voters were presented with a simple question as to each justice or
judge: “Shall (Name of Candidate) be retained or replaced in office as
a Judge of the (Name of Court)?”173 Two of the five supreme court
justices (Justice Janice Holder, a Republican appointee, and Justice
William Koch, a Democratic appointee) were retiring and not
standing for retention. Their replacements, Jeffrey Bivins and Holly
Kirby, already had been named by the Republican governor, Bill
Haslam, but would not assume their places on the bench until
September 1, 2014 and thus would not stand for retention until
170. Justice Penny White was not retained in 1995 after a spirited campaign,
which was led by the Tennessee Conservative Union and based upon her perceived
opposition to the death penalty. Cornett & Lyon, supra note 65, at 2121 (citing
Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid
Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decision?, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 310 (1997)).
171. See Cornett & Lyon, supra note 65, at 2121 n.205 (observing that between
1886 and 1998, 61 of 63 justices who served on the Tennessee Supreme Court, or
97%, were Democrats).
172. See, e.g., id. at 2091–95, 2118–22; Penny J. White & Malia Reddick, A
Response to Professor Fitzpatrick: The Rest of the Story, 75 TENN. L. REV. 501 (2007–
2008); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Election as Appointment: The Tennessee Plan
Reconsidered, 75 TENN. L. REV. 473 (2007–2008).
173. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-115(b)(1) (2009), repealed by 2016 Pub. Acts, ch.
528, § 15 (effective Jan. 28, 2016).
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August 2016. Therefore, only three of the five state supreme court
justices (Chief Justice Gary Wade and Justices Connie Clark and
Sharon Lee) were standing for retention, and all three of the justices
had been appointed by Democratic governor Phil Bredesen. This
ostensibly left the “swing” vote on the court hanging in the balance;
if only one of the three justices were not retained by the voters, then
Governor Haslam would have the opportunity to appoint his or her
replacement, and a majority of the court would be made up of
Republican appointees for the first time in modern history.
This shift would not only affect the court’s long-term decisionmaking, but also have the immediate impact of changing the state’s
attorney general. The Tennessee Supreme Court’s power to appoint
the attorney general is unique among all state supreme courts, and
the new court was to exert that power in September 2014,
immediately following the retention election.174 A majority
Republican court would presumably appoint a Republican attorney
general.175 At least one of the targeted justices, Sharon Lee, sought
to blunt the impact of this issue by telling one of the largest
newspapers in the state several weeks before the election that she
was not on the supreme court in 2006 when Democrat Bob Cooper
was selected as attorney general. She believed it was traditional for
state attorneys general to serve only one term, and she would work
with the two new Republican appointees to “select the best
applicant” for the attorney general position.176
This “low-hanging fruit” of three Democratically-appointed
supreme court justices, which previously had seemed “forbidden,”

174. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (“An Attorney General and Reporter for the State,
shall be appointed by the Judges of the Supreme Court and shall hold his office for a
term of eight years.”).
175. Lieutenant Governor Ron Ramsey, who became the public face of the
“Replace” campaign, told the crowd at a Nashville Republican fundraiser “[f]olks, it’s
time that we had a Republican attorney general in the state of Tennessee.” Dahlia
Lithwick, How to Take Out a Supreme Court Justice, SLATE (June 13, 2014, 5:01
PM),
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/06/tennessee_
supreme_court_justices_gary_wade_cornelia_clark_and_sharon_lee.html. See Victor
Ashe, The Supreme Court Battle, SHOPPER NEWS (Apr. 22, 2014),
http://shoppernewsnow.com/victor-ashe/the-supreme-court-battle/ (observing months
before the election that the primary reason for the retention challenge was
appointment of the attorney general and noting the irony “that this process, which
was designed to remove the attorney general selection from politics, has forced these
three justices into a political fight statewide for their survival on the court.”).
176. Tom Humphrey, Supremes Say They’ll Pick Next AG in “Non-Partisan
Manner”; Collect $100K at First of Several Campaign Fundraisers, KNOXVILLE NEWS
SENTINEL, May 20, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 26835004.
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was too tempting for some Republicans to resist. A vigorous “Vote
Replace” campaign was led, both financially and in spirit, by
Lieutenant Governor and Speaker of the Senate Ron Ramsey (RBlountville).177 Over $2.4 million was spent on both sides to contest
what previously had been a sleepy summer election, including $1.13
million by the judges themselves and groups supporting them.178 The
campaign was, on its face at least, unsuccessful, as Justices Wade
and Lee were retained by fifty-seven percent of voters and Justice
Clark was retained by fifty-six percent.179 The leader of the
“Replace” effort, Senator Ramsey, was unperturbed, congratulating
the justices and, implicitly, himself, for a “real election for the
Supreme Court” that required the justices to travel the state
stumping for votes (or, in his words, “meeting Tennesseans and
learning things about our state that you can't find in any law
book”).180 Despite the outcome of the election, the message from
Senator Ramsey and those supporting his efforts, which two of the
authors clairvoyantly identified in a 2011 article as “[d]on’t go too far
to the left, or we will institute contested elections and spend millions
to defeat you,”181 appeared to have some immediate impact. The
court did in fact appoint a Republican attorney general in the person
of Herbert Slatery, a prominent Knoxville attorney who served as

177. The primary arguments made by the groups opposing the justices were that
they were “soft on crime,” “anti-business,” and, bizarrely, supportive of the
Affordable Care and Patient Protection Act, a federal law about which the state
supreme court would never be asked to sit in judgment. Id.; see also Brian Haas, TN
Supreme Court Battle Brings National Money, Scrutiny, THE TENNESSEAN (Aug. 5,
2014), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2014/08/04 /tn-supreme-courtbattle-brings-national-money-scrutiny/13550987/.
178. Mark Joseph Stern, An Unexpected Triumph for Justice, SLATE (Nov. 7,
2014), http://www. slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/11/state_
judicial_elections_2014_conservatives_failed_to_stack_supreme_courts.html.
179. Niraj Chokshi, Three Tennessee Supreme Court Justices Survive HighStakes Campaign to Keep Seats, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 8, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat /wp/2014/08/08/3-tennessee-supremecourt-justices-survive-a-high-stakes-campaign-to-keep-their-seats/.
180. Brian Haas, Tennesseans Vote to Retain Supreme Court Justices, THE
TENNESSEAN (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics
/2014/08/07/tennesseans-vote-retain-supreme-court-justices/13756359/.
Some observers agreed with this sentiment. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Lessons from
Tennessee Supreme Court Retention Election, THE TENNESSEAN (Aug. 20, 2014),
http://www.tennessean.com/story/opinion/2014/08/21/lessons-tennessee-supremecourt-retention-election/14352389/ (“Although I am sure the justices did not enjoy
going through a tough vote, it was good for them — and for our system of justice.”).
181. Cornett & Lyon, supra note 65, at 2121.
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Governor Haslam’s chief legal counsel for several years.182 Shortly
thereafter, it immediately sought out a summary judgment case to
use as a vehicle to overturn Hannan.183 Given the timing of events, it
is impossible to separate Rye from its political environment.
The other landmark event in 2014 affecting Tennessee’s judicial
branch was the adoption of a constitutional amendment changing
how Tennessee selects its appellate court judges. Prior to the
amendment, the Tennessee Constitution unambiguously stated that
“[j]udges of the Supreme Court shall be elected by the qualified
voters of the State.”184 The Tennessee Plan, with its system of
nomination by committee, gubernatorial appointment, independent
evaluation, and popular retention election, was a legislative solution
designed to comply with the state constitution, yet avoid costly,
contested, state-wide elections and ensure that the emphasis would
be on the merits of judicial candidates rather than their political
skill or ideology. The Tennessee Plan had its critics, but it survived
numerous constitutional challenges over the years, most recently in
2014.185 As Tennessee’s political climate shifted and more of those
critics began to populate the legislature that created the system, it
became increasingly clear that the Tennessee Plan’s days were
numbered. Some clamored for popular election of Tennessee
Supreme Court justices; despite the obvious problems with this
approach, it had the benefit of both remaining true to the language
of the state constitution and ensuring that the judicial branch
maintain its independence from the legislature. However, popular
elections were opposed by a coalition of bar associations; business
interests; Republican leaders such as the governor, speaker of the

182. Richard Locker, Tennessee Supreme Court Appoints Slatery as Attorney
General, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.knoxnews.com
/news/local/tennessee-supreme-court-appoints-slatery-as-state-attorney-general-ep615431514-354266801.html. After the retention election, Justice Lee, who was
elected by the court to a term as chief justice beginning September 1, 2014, clarified
her earlier comments regarding selection of the attorney general as “simply
mean[ing] she would respect the thoughts of all four colleagues equally, including the
two newest members of the Supreme Court bench.” Tom Humphrey, On Supreme
Decision Making in Selection of a TN Attorney General, KNOXNEWS.COM (Sept. 1,
2014), http:// knoxblogs.com/humphreyhill/2014/09/01/supreme-decision-makingselection-tn-attorney-general/.
183. See supra discussion in Part I.E.
184. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (amended Nov. 4, 2014).
185. Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409 (Tenn. 2014). This unanimous opinion
was reached by five special justices, who were appointed after all of the sitting
justices recused themselves from the matter.
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house, and speaker of the senate; and many other Republican and
Democratic legislators.186 Thus, a compromise was reached in the
form of a constitutional amendment that would institutionalize the
appointment of judges by the governor but also give the legislature a
role in the process.187 The constitutional amendment states, in
relevant part:
Judges of the Supreme Court or any intermediate appellate
court shall be appointed for a full term or to fill a vacancy by
and at the discretion of the governor; shall be confirmed by
the Legislature; and thereafter, shall be elected in a
retention election by the qualified voters of the state.
Confirmation by default occurs if the Legislature fails to
reject an appointee within sixty calendar days of either the
date of appointment, if made during the annual legislative
session, or the convening date of the next annual legislative
session, if made out of session. The Legislature is authorized
to prescribe such provisions as may be necessary to carry out
Sections two and three of this article.
Under Tennessee’s constitutional amendment process, the
amendment was passed by both houses of the General Assembly in
successive sessions before appearing on the ballot in November 2014
as the second of four proposed constitutional amendments. The “Yes”
campaign for Amendment Two was led by a bipartisan group of
prominent Tennessee politicians including Governor Bill Haslam,
former Governor Phil Bredesen, and former U.S. Senator Fred
Thompson and was vocally supported by Chief Justice Sharon Lee
and lawyers’ groups throughout the state, including the Tennessee
Bar Association.188 Although some commentators expressed

186. Cornett & Lyon, supra note 65, at 2091–93, 2118–21.
187. In a debate on Amendment Two held in October 2014 at the University of
Tennessee College of Law with long-time opponent of the Tennessee Plan John Jay
Hooker, the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Brian Kelsey (RGermantown), referred to Amendment Two as the “Founding Fathers Plus Plan” and
stated that the amendment was “hatched at a Memphis meeting of the Federalist
Society.” Frank Daniels III, John Jay Hooker, Brian Kelsey Debate on Amendment 2
a Draw, THE TENNESSEAN (Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.tennessean.com/story/ opinion
/columnists/frank-daniels/2014/10/24/john-jay-hooker-brian-kelsey-debateamendment-draw/17852017/.
188. Amendment 2 to the Tennessee Constitution, Tennessee Bar Association,
http://www.tba.org/info/amendment-2-to-the-tennessee-constitution, (last visited
Aug. 18, 2016).
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skepticism regarding Amendment Two,189 no organized opposition to
the amendment ever emerged, and it passed easily with over sixty
percent of the vote and more than half of the number of votes
required in the governor’s election,190 as required by the state
constitution’s amendment provisions.191 In early 2016, after the
summer 2015 retirement of Justice Gary Wade, Roger Page became
the first Tennessee Supreme Court justice to be appointed and
confirmed under the new process.192 Justice Page, along with 2014
appointees Justice Bivins and Justice Kirby, were all easily retained
by the voters in August 2016.193
As a result of Amendment Two’s passage, Tennesseans will not
be subjected to partisan judicial elections. The price for this is a
system that ensures that the executive and legislative branches—not
the people of Tennessee—will select the members of the state’s
highest court and intermediate appellate courts. Moreover, nothing
prevents those same politicians from seeking to oust those same
judges every eight years if they stray ideologically in their decisions
on the bench. Indeed, the “Replace” campaign led by Senate Speaker
Ron Ramsey and his allies in 2014 suggests that even a perceived
lack of ideological purity based on the party of the appointing
governor may leave a jurist exposed. Given this context, it would not
be surprising that Rye and other recent decisions might reflect the
political realities the justices are facing.

189. Frank Cagle, then a columnist in the now-defunct Knoxville alt-weekly
newspaper Metropulse, “penned a blistering critique” of the proposed Amendment 2
several weeks prior to the election. Tom Humphrey, Columnist: Amendment 2 Would
Make Judges “Lackeys and Lapdogs” of the Legislature, KNOXNEWS.COM (July 26,
2014),
http://knoxblogs.com/humphrey
hill/2014/07/26/columnist-amendment-2make-judges-lackeys-lapdogs-legislature/. Cagle posed this choice to prospective
voters: “If you vote Yes on Amendment Two, you are giving up your right to vote and
turning control of the courts over to the Governor and the Legislature. If you vote No
there is at least a chance that the independence of the state judiciary will be
restored.” Id.
190. Dave Boucher, Amendment 2 to Change Judicial Selection Passes, THE
TENNESSEAN (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics
/2014/11/05/amendment-change-judicial-selection-leads/18499123/.
191. TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
192. Joel Ebert, Lawmakers Confirm Roger Page to Tennessee Supreme Court,
THE TENNESSEAN (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news
/politics/2016/02/22/lawmakers-confirm-roger-page-tennessee-supremecourt/80775744/.
193. August 4, 2016 Unofficial Election Results, http://elections.tn.gov/
results.php?ByOffice=Sup reme%20Court (last visited Aug. 18, 2016).
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2. A Loss of State Court “Independence”
Thirty-five years ago, a student comment in this journal asserted
that the Tennessee Supreme Court was “an avid proponent of [a]
recent national trend toward independence in the state courts.”194
That article outlined the history of state constitutional
interpretation throughout the life of our Republic and concluded that
the states, and particularly Tennessee, were in a federalist period in
which they were inclined to find independent and adequate bases for
constitutional decisions that were grounded in the state constitution
rather than the federal constitution.195 Basing a decision on
language or rights contained in the state constitution allows a state
supreme court to evade review by the U.S. Supreme Court and adopt
a more expansive view of civil rights and liberties, even where the
language of the federal and state constitutional provisions are
identical or very similar.196 Indeed, Tennessee has a long history of
judicial “independence,” rejecting U.S. Supreme Court constitutional
interpretations in favor of more protective doctrines based on state
constitutional provisions, which sometimes are worded differently
but other times are indistinguishable in their text from federal
provisions.197 The article makes a persuasive argument that the
pendulum had swung back toward use of the independent and
adequate state-ground doctrine in Tennessee. However, a review of
recent decisions by the Tennessee Supreme Court suggests that
those days are over and we have entered an era of conformity with
federal standards and provisions. Although Rye involves conforming
a state rule to a federal rule where they are worded similarly, rather
194. Carolyn Jourdan, Comment, Tennessee Judicial Activism: Renaissance of
Federalism, 49 TENN. L. REV. 135, 135 (1981–82).
195. Id. at 138–39.
196. Id. at 140. While state courts of last resort are welcome to adopt a more
expansive and protective interpretation of language in the state constitution, they
may not do the opposite and take a more restrictive view of a state constitutional
right than exists for that same right under the federal constitution. By way of
analogy to the civil procedure realm, the U.S. Supreme Court determines the extent
to which the Due Process Clause protects an out-of-state defendant from being
subject to personal jurisdiction in the courts of another state; states, correspondingly,
may adopt long-arm statutes that provide greater protection to out-of-state
defendants, but may not exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant where
the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in its personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence, would not permit it. A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 45–47 (4th ed. 2016).
197. See generally Jourdan, supra note 194; State v. Moats, 403 S.W.3d 170, 187
n.8 (Tenn. 2013).
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than a constitutional issue, it is illustrative of this trend to conform
Tennessee standards to federal standards. It is striking that this is
occurring in a conservative political environment with a General
Assembly that has pushed back against what it deems to be
encroachments by a federal executive branch that was led by a
Democratic president from 2009 to 2017. This begs the question of
the real reason for this “federalization of Tennessee law.”
One area in which Tennessee has a long history of developing its
own protections based upon the state constitution is criminal
procedure. While civil litigants may focus on changes to the
summary judgment standard, the post-2014 court has been even
more proactive in the area of constitutional criminal procedure,
limiting rights that had previously existed under the state
constitution to bring Tennessee in line with federal cases.
In State v. McCormick,198 the court reconsidered whether it
should adopt a community caretaking exception to the warrant
requirement. That exception permits a warrantless search of an
automobile and seizure of evidence found in that search where it
“was undertaken pursuant to the officer's ‘community caretaking
functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal
statute.’”199 Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1973 decision
originating the community caretaking doctrine,200 the vast majority
of lower federal courts and states have adopted it as an exception to
the warrant requirement.201 Tennessee, however, was one of a small
minority of states declining to adopt community caretaking as an
exception to the warrant requirement for searches and seizures.
Instead, the Tennessee Supreme Court had “limited the community
caretaking doctrine to third-tier ‘consensual police-citizen
encounters that do not require probable cause or reasonable
suspicion . . . .’”202 In fact, the supreme court addressed the issue
directly in 2013 and, in a 3–2 decision, declined to adopt a more
expansive view of the community caretaking function. In so doing,
the majority stated:
[T]his Court has for decades interpreted article I, section 7 of

198. State v. McCormick, 494 S.W.3d 673, 675 (Tenn. 2016).
199. Id. at 681 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)).
200. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
201. McCormick, 494 S.W.3d at 682; Moats, 403 S.W.3d at 191 (Clark & Koch,
JJ., dissenting).
202. McCormick, 494 S.W.3d at 683 (quoting Moats, 403 S.W.3d at 182).
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the Tennessee Constitution[203] as imposing stronger
protections than those of the federal constitution, which,
under stare decisis, we are not prepared to dismissively
brush aside. Particularly in the area of search and seizure
law, we have often rejected the standards adopted by the
United States Supreme Court in favor of more protective
doctrines, tests, and rules.204
Of course, the court’s makeup was very different in 2016 than it
was in 2013. The author of Moats, Justice Gary Wade, had retired,
as had one of the other justices constituting the slim majority. One of
the dissenters in Moats, Justice Connie Clark, became the author of
the court’s unanimous decision in McCormick. In adopting
community caretaking as an exception to the warrant requirement,
the McCormick court criticized “[t]he Moats majority [for]
ground[ing] this limitation [of the community caretaking doctrine] in
the Tennessee Constitution, even though the defendant had neither
relied upon the state constitution nor argued that it provided greater
protection than the Fourth Amendment, and even though this Court
had ‘long held’ that article I, section 7 ‘is identical in intent and
purpose to the Fourth Amendment.’”205 As for overruling a decision
that was only thirty-one months old, the court stressed that Moats
was out of line with the majority of federal courts and other states
and cited Rye (among other cases) for the proposition that the
principle of stare decisis does not compel the court to adhere to
erroneous or “unworkable” precedent.206
The Tennessee Supreme Court also recently decided State v.
Reynolds.207 The U.S. Supreme Court adopted a good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule over thirty years ago, which permits the use

203. “That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and that general warrants,
whereby an officer may be commanded to search suspected places, without evidence
of the fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offences
are not particularly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty
and ought not to be granted.” Article I, section 7 is the Tennessee cConstitution’s
equivalent to the United States Constitution’s Fourth Amendment. TENN. CONST.
art. I, § 7.
204. Moats, 403 S.W.3d at 187 n.8.
205. McCormick, 494 S.W.3d at 683–84 (quoting State v. Williams, 185 S.W.3d
311, 315 (Tenn. 2006)) (internal citations omitted).
206. Id.
207. State v. Reynolds, __ S.W.3d __, No. E2013-02309- SC-R11-CD, 2016 WL
6525840567 (Tenn. Nov. 3, 2016).
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of evidence at trial so long as officers acted in good faith and
reasonably in obtaining it, even if that evidence later turns out to be
inadmissible.208 The Tennessee Supreme Court had never directly
addressed the issue of whether a good-faith exception to the warrant
requirement exists under the Tennessee Constitution.209 In
Reynolds, the court adopted a limited good-faith exception to the
warrant requirement that “applies only when the law enforcement
officers’ action is in objectively reasonable good faith reliance on
‘binding appellate precedent’ that ‘specifically authorizes a particular
police practice.’”210 Citing McCormick, the court stated that it had
“long recognized that article I, section 7 [of the Tennessee
Constitution] is identical in intent and purpose to the Fourth
Amendment [to the U.S. Constitution].”211 Moreover, the court had
recognized other exceptions to the warrant requirement, and
adopting the good-faith exception did not require it “to overrule ‘a
settled development of state constitutional law.’”212
Finally, the court recently granted review in another criminal
procedure case indicating that it is reconsidering long-held
Tennessee precedent interpreting the state constitution as providing
greater rights than the federal constitution provides. The supreme
court held in 1989213 that the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test214
for measuring probable cause was more consistent with the
Tennessee Constitution’s requirement that a search warrant not be
issued “without evidence of the fact committed”215 than was the
“totality of the circumstances” test subsequently adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates.216 The court has not reconsidered

208. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); see also Stacey Barchenger,
Justices Weigh “Good Faith” Intentions of Police, THE TENNESSEEAN (Oct. 1, 2015),
http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2015/09/30/justices-weigh-good-faithexception/73039504/.
209. However, it is notable that the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, after
extensive analysis, concluded that “adopting a good faith exception under the
Tennessee Constitution would unduly reduce the protections contemplated for our
citizens by the Tennessee Constitution, the legislature, and the Tennessee Supreme
Court.” State v. Huskey, 177 S.W.3d 868, 890 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005).
210. Reynolds, 2016 WL 6525856, at *20 (quoting Davis v. United States, 564
U.S. 229, 241 (2011)).
204. Id. (citing McCormick, 494 S.W.3d at 683–84).
212. Id. (quoting State v. Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d 730, 733-34 (Tenn. 1997)).
213. State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989).
214. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410 (1969).
215. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 7.
216. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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that decision until now. Recently, the court issued an order granting
the State permission to appeal in the case of State v. Tuttle.217 In the
order, the court stated that it “is interested in briefing and argument
of the question whether this Court should revisit the continuing
vitality of State v. Jacumin . . . ,”218 an issue that was not addressed
in the State’s Rule 11 application or by the courts below. This, of
course, was the same language the court used in its order granting
Rule 11 review in Rye, only with regard to Jacumin instead of
Hannan.219
The Tennessee Supreme Court in the post-2014 world is made up
of three Republican appointees and two Democratic appointees who
faced a difficult retention election. All of the justices face another
retention election in six years. All indications thus far show that the
court will be an activist in favor of defense interests in civil cases
and the state’s interests in criminal cases, with stare decisis giving
faint opposition to the court’s objectives.220 Perhaps this new era of
the Tennessee Supreme Court can be defined less by conforming to
federal law and more by conforming to political expectations.
CONCLUSION
Tennessee’s summary judgment law inscribes an arc from its
Edenic origin in 1971 through its development of the plaintifffriendly negation requirement to its current defendant-friendly
adoption of the federal Celotex standard. The rise and fall of the
negation requirement reflects the changing composition of the

217. State v. Tuttle, No. M2014-00566-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 5251990 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Sept. 8, 2015), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Feb. 18, 2016).
218. Order Granting Permission to Appeal, No. M2014-00566-SC-R11-CD, 2016
Tenn. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. February 18, 2016).
219. One commentator stated: “[R]egardless of the specific question involved, the
Tennessee Supreme Court’s new philosophy is clear: no prior precedent bolstering
the rights of the accused under Tennessee law—no matter how recent or longestablished—stands on firm footing any longer.” Daniel Horwitz, Tennessee Supreme
Court Restricts Coram Nobis Relief, Overturning Recent Precedent Yet Again,
SCOTBLOG.ORG (July 21, 2016), http://scotblog.org/ 2016/07/tennessee-supreme-courtrestricts-coram-nobis-relief-overturning-recent-precedent-yet-again/.
220. Indeed, in one recent opinion the court overturned its own interpretation of
the state’s error coram nobis statute from four years earlier. Frazier v. State, No.
M2014-02374-SC-R11-ECN, 2016 WL 3668035 (Tenn. July 7, 2016) (overruling
Wlodarz v. State, 361 S.W.3d 490 (Tenn. 2012)). Chief Justice Lee, who of course
concurred in both Rye and McCormick, dissented, taking objection with the
majority’s disregard of stare decisis in overruling Wlodarz. Id. at *8 (Lee, C.J.,
dissenting).
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Tennessee Supreme Court and the current court’s preference for a
tight screening mechanism for claims. Only those claims for which
parties can obtain solid evidence through discovery should proceed to
trial. Claims for which proponents have no evidence at the summary
judgment stage—and those for which evidence is more difficult to
obtain, or for which the supporting evidence is viewed as weak—are
dismissed prior to trial. The court’s adoption of the Celotex standard
for summary judgment is consistent with the “front-loading” of civil
litigation in the federal courts in recent years. Screening out cases
earlier and earlier in the litigation process inevitably means that
fewer meritorious cases will get to the trial stage, a result the
current Tennessee Supreme Court is willing to tolerate.
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